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Abstract- The confidentiality of personal health records is a 
major problem when patients use commercial Web-based 
systems to store their health data. Traditional access control 
mechanisms, such as Role-Based Access Control, have several 
limitations with respect to enforcing access control policies and 
ensuring data confidentiality. In particular, the data has to be 
stored on a central server locked by the access control 
mechanism, and the data owner loses control on the data from 
the moment when the data is sent to the requester. Therefore, 
these mechanisms do not fulfil the requirements of data 
outsourcing scenarios where the third party storing the data 
should not have access to the plain data, and it is not trusted to 
enforce access control policies. In this paper, we describe a new 
approach which enables secure storage and controlled sharing of 
patient’s health records in the aforementioned scenarios. A new 
variant of a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme 
is proposed to enforce patient/organizational access control 
policies such that everyone can download the encrypted data but 
only authorized users from the social domain (e.g. family, friends, 
or fellow patients) or authorized users from the professional 
domain (e.g. doctors or nurses) are allowed to decrypt it.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In recent times, the healthcare delivery has gradually 
extended from acute institutional care to outpatient care and 
home healthcare.  Healthcare services can now be availed at a 
distance due to the advances in communication and 
information technology. An increasing number of telehealth 
services (remote patient monitoring, teleradiology, etc.) are 
becoming available. Besides these, there are a number of 
initiatives for adoption of electronic health records (EHRs) 
from different governments around the world as well as from 
the private sector that is striving towards adoption of personal 
health records (PHR). While EHR systems function to serve 
the information needs of health care professionals, PHR 
systems capture health data entered by individuals and provide 
information related to the care of those individuals. Besides 
providing the repository services to the individuals to store 
their health related data, PHR systems also include other 
functionality such as decision support functionality. All of 
these changes in the healthcare are expected to result in the 
following benefits: 1) reduction in the healthcare cost, 2) 
increasing the patient safety, 3) improving the quality of care, 
4) involving and empowering patients to more actively 
manage their health. However there are still some challenges 
that have to be overcome before the full potential benefits of 
these new healthcare technologies are realized. One of the 
very important challenges PHR and EHR systems are facing is 
the confidentiality of patient’s health information. Before 
going into the detail discussion of how to address the 
confidentiality issue, let us introduce PHRs. According to [1], 
the PHR is defined as: 
“An electronic application through which individuals can 
access, manage and share their health information, and that 
of others for whom they are authorized, in a private, secure, 
and confidential environment.” 
There are number of web services that an individual can 
use to store his/her PHRs including the prominent examples of 
Microsoft HealthVault, Google Health or WebMD. They 
allow individuals to enter, store and share their own health 
data, upload health measurements from their devices, but also 
to import their health records from hospital EHR systems. In 
realization of the full benefits of these solutions, 
interoperability plays a key role. Continua health alliance is an 
industry initiative in this direction which aims at providing 
interoperability standards across the whole eco system of 
personal healthcare. 
Despite numerous initiatives by industry and a number of 
standards under development to provide the interoperability 
across different PHR and EHR services, security and privacy 
remain major obstacles with respect to the adoption of the 
PHRs by the individuals. Many consumers do not trust 
commercial companies to manage their PHRs. Next to that, in 
modern healthcare, where a lot of IT functionality gets 
outsourced, patients are worried if their health data will be 
treated as confidential by companies running data centres. To 
address these issues related to security and confidentiality of 
individual’s health information, we propose a new variant of a 
ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) 
scheme which enables patients to securely store and  share 
their health records on a commercial PHR system. Our CP-
ABE scheme allows the patient to store her PHRs in an 
encrypted form, and cryptographically enforces patient or 
organizational access policies. The scheme enables sharing of 
patient’s data with users from different domains, based on 
attributes certified by multiple authorities. For example, a 
patient can encrypt her data as such that it can be accessed by 
an individual from a social domain (e.g. his/her adult children) 
as well as from the professional domain (e.g. doctors or 
nurses).  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II 
we describe traditional access control mechanisms.  In section 
III we discuss how to enforce access policies using 
cryptographic techniques, and give some background 
information about CP-ABE. In section IV we introduce our 
security requirements for securing personal health records. In 
section V we describe the proposed system architecture and 
introduce a new variant of a CP-ABE scheme. The last section 
concludes the paper. 
II. ACCESS CONTROL 
Access-control mechanisms comprise a very large set of 
technologies, which include mechanisms to authenticate and 
authorize individuals or systems to access resources. The main 
objective of access-control mechanisms is to provide data 
confidentiality. There are many authentication and 
authorization mechanisms, ranging from simple username-
password combinations to federated role-based access 
schemes (where a claim of one institution that a certain person 
has some specific role, e.g. nurse, may be sufficient to provide 
that person access to some resource at another institution).  
Access control mechanisms can be grouped into four main 
classes: discretionary, mandatory, role-based and attribute-
based. In a discretionary access control (DAC) model [2] 
access is controlled based on user identities and a number of 
rules, called authorizations. The authorization rules explicitly 
state which subjects can execute which actions on which 
resources. After a user makes an access request, the access 
control is enforced based on the identity of the requester and 
on the authorization rules involving the requester and the 
requested object and action. In a mandatory access control 
(MAC) model [3], access is controlled based on mandated 
policies determined by a central authority. These policies are 
based on classifications associated with subjects and objects 
(security levels and a set of categories). In a role-based access 
control (RBAC) model [4], access is controlled based on 
user’s roles and on rules defining which roles can execute 
which actions on which resources. Finally, in an attribute-
based access control model (ABAC), access is controlled 
based on user’s attributes. More details about the ABAC 
model will be given in the next section. 
A. Attribute-Based Access Control 
Attribute-based access control is an approach where the 
access decision is based on attributes (properties) of the 
resource, the requestor and the environment. This model 
provides flexibility and scalability that are essential in large 
distributed open environments where subjects are identified 
by characteristics. It can be implemented using digital 
credentials, that is, digitally signed assertions about credential 
owner by a credential issuer. More precisely, an attribute 
certificate can be used to support attribute-based systems. 
Such certificate contains attributes that specify access control 
information associated with the certificate holder. The 
decision to access a resource is based on the attributes in 
requestor's credentials. The attempts to provide a uniform 
framework for attribute-based access control and enforcement 
include the works of Bonati and Samarati [5] and Yu et al. [6]. 
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) is 
an XML specification for expressing policies for data control 
over the Internet. It is intended to define the representation for 
rules that specify who, what, when, and how can access 
information. The ABAC model can be easily implemented 
using XACML due to its generic authorization architecture. 
Attributes can be related to the subject, resource and 
environment. XACML allows using the subject, resource and 
environmental attributes in the policy evaluation. This 
language supports the following features:  
• Policies can be shared across different applications. 
• Policies can be maintained in one or more locations. 
• The application environment is isolated from the 
authorization process. 
• Different access control mechanisms are supported, e.g.  
ABAC, RBAC, etc.  
Based on the above features, XACML is regarded as the 
standard for solving complex access control problems, e.g. the 
access control in healthcare. The major components and actors 
of the XACML framework data flow are: 1) PEP (policy 
enforcement point) is responsible for implementing the policy 
evaluation decision, 2) PDP (policy decision point) is 
responsible for evaluation of the policies, 3) PAP (policy 
administrator point) writes the access control policies and 
makes them available to the PDP, 4) PIP (policy information 
point) returns the requested attributes to the PDP for the 
policy evaluation. Currently the OASIS Cross-Enterprise 
Security and Privacy Authorization (XSPA) technical 
committee is developing the XACML profile for healthcare 
enterprises. For more information and examples, please refer 
to the OASIS website [7]. 
III. ENFORCING ABAC USING CRYPTOGRAPHY 
In the aforementioned access-control mechanisms the 
receiving end of the information must provide a set of 
credentials to the Access-Control Manager (ACM) who is 
responsible to enforce access control policies. The ACM 
checks whether user credentials satisfy the access control 
policy. If so, the user can read the resource, otherwise not. 
The drawback of this approach is that the data has to be stored 
on a central server locked by the access control mechanism. 
Furthermore, the data owner loses control on the data from the 
moment when the data is sent to the requester.  This is also not 
suitable for data outsourcing scenarios where the third party 
storing the data should not have access on the plain data, and 
where the third party is not trusted to enforce access control 
policies (for example, patients hesitate to upload their PHRs to 
Google Health or Microsoft HealthVault). Therefore, recent 
proposals on enforcing access control policies exploit the use 
of cryptography to enforce access control policies. In such 
systems, there is no need for an ACM to check user 
credentials, and every user can get the encrypted data, but 
only users who have the right credentials can decrypt the 
encrypted data.   
In a public key cryptography, each user has a key pair: a 
private key which is kept secret, and a public key which is 
public. The encryptor encrypts the data using the public key of 
the recipient, and the recipient can decrypt the data using his 
secret key. In Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), the encryptor 
has to use a digital certificate in order to be sure that the data 
is encrypted with the public key of the intended recipient. 
However, in ABAC model the access to data is based on 
user’s roles/attributes, and PKI will not work for situations 
when the user does not know the exact identity of the recipient. 
PKI is also not suitable to be applied to access control. The 
main problems are certificates and the key lifecycle 
management problem.  For example, if a patient wants to send 
a secure email to multiple users in HospitalA, the patient needs 
to know the digital certificate for each recipient, and then 
encrypt the same data many times using each user public key. 
Therefore, we need a crypto scheme which offers a more 
suitable solution for enforcing access policies based on user 
attributes. 
A. Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption 
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) is 
a type of attribute-based encryption scheme which can be used 
to enforce ABAC cryptographically and address some of the 
aforementioned requirements. In CP-ABE, the data owner 
encrypts the data according to an access control policy P 
defined over a set of attributes, and the receiving end can 
decrypt the encrypted data only if his secret key associated 
with a set of attributes satisfies P. For example, suppose Alice 
encrypts her data according to an access policy P= (a1 AND a2) 
OR a3.  Bob can decrypt the encrypted data only if his secret 
key is associated with a set of attributes that satisfy the access 
policy. To satisfy P, Bob must have a secret key associated 
with at least one from the following attribute sets: (a1, a2), (a3) 
or (a1, a2, a3).  In general, CP-ABE scheme consists of the 
following four algorithms [8],[9]: 
• Setup algorithm (MK, PK) ← Setup (1k): is run by the 
trusted authority or the security administrator. The setup 
algorithm takes as input a security parameter k and outputs 
a master secret key MK and a master public key PK.  
• Key Generation algorithm (SK) ← Key Gen (MK, ω): is 
run by the trusted authority, and takes as input a set of 
attributes ω and MK. The algorithm outputs a user secret 
key SK associated with the attribute set ω. 
• Encrypt algorithm (CT) ← Encrypt (m, PK, P): is run by 
the encryptor. The input of the algorithm is a message m, a 
master public key PK and an access control policy P, the 
output of the algorithm is a ciphertext CT encrypted under 
the access control policy P. 
• Decrypt algorithm (m) ← Decrypt (CT, SK): is run by the 
decryptor. The input of the algorithm is a ciphertext CT to 
be decrypted and a user secret key SK. The output of the 
algorithm is a message m, if the attribute set of the secret 
key satisfies the access policy P under which the message 
was encrypted, or an error message if the attribute set of the 
secret key does not satisfies the access policy P under 
which the message was encrypted. 
IV. ADDRESSED PROBLEM 
The problem addressed in this paper is the confidentiality 
of PHRs. Patients records contain sensitive information such 
as details of a patient’s disease, drug usage, sexual preferences, 
etc. Inappropriate disclosure of a record can change patient's 
life, and there may be no way to repair such harm financially 
or technically. Therefore, it is crucial to protect patient’s 
health records when they are uploaded and stored in 
commercial Web-based systems. In this paper, we consider a 
scenario (see Fig. 1) where a patient, an entity in a distributed 
system, has some sensitive personal health records which she 
wants to store securely in a Web-based PHR, and share them 
with other users who belong to two different security domains: 
(a) professional domain (PD) - a group of healthcare providers 
e.g. doctors, nurses, or (b) social domain (SD) - her family, 
friends, or fellow patients. The scenario stresses the need for a 
system which has to fulfil the following security requirements: 
• Protect health records from network sniffers. Therefore, the 
data have to be encrypted before it is sent to the web PHR.  
 
Fig. 1 System Architecture 
• Protect health records from third parties who store PHRs.  
The third party managing web PHRs should not have 
access to the plain data. 
• The access policy should be sticked to the encrypted data, 
such that only users who have a secret key associated with 
a set of attributes which satisfies the policy might be 
capable of decrypting it. 
• Both users from the professional domain and users from the 
social domain need to be properly authenticated and 
authorized to access the data. 
V. OUR SOLUTION 
We propose a variant of a CP-ABE scheme where the 
patient can encrypt her health records according to an access 
policy which has attributes issued by two trusted authorities: 
the trusted authority (TA1) of the professional domain (PD) 
and the trusted authority (TA2) of the social domain (SD). The 
patient himself could also take the role of TA2. TA1 will 
authenticate users of the professional domain, and issue secret 
keys based on their attributes, while the patient might use the 
reputation of the users of the social domain to generate 
appropriate secret keys. For example, using our solution the 
patient can encrypt her health data such that a user who has 
the attribute General Practitioner issued from the TA1 of the 
professional domain, or the attribute friend issued by the 
patient can decrypt the encrypted data. Our scheme is suitable 
for the healthcare setting and has the following benefits: 
• Allows a patient to store her PHRs in a protected form on 
an un-trusted commercial PHR server such that the access 
control policy is fully enforced.  The patient encrypts the 
health data according to her access policy such that only the 
users who satisfy the access policy can decrypt the 
protected data. 
• Helps the patient to share securely their PHRs with users 
from different security domains. This is because the access 
policy under which the data is encrypted can contain 
attributes issued from different trusted authorities. 
• Removes the need for the patient to know the identity of the 
data recipient. The patient specifies only the attributes the 
recipient needs to have in order to access patient’s data. 
In the next section we demonstrate how to apply the 
proposed scheme to securely manage Personal Health Records 
(PHRs). 
A. Proposed System Architecture 
Fig. 2 depicts the architecture of the proposed system 
where the patient can securely manage her health records 
using the proposed CP-ABE scheme (the details of the 
proposed CP-ABE scheme are given in the next section). In 
the following we explain the interactions that occur in the 
system.  
• In the 1st step, the trusted authority (TA1) from the 
professional domain and the patient (TA2) from the social 
domain run the Setup algorithm of their CP-ABE scheme.  
• In the 2nd step, users from the professional domain get their 
secret keys related to their attributes they possess from the 
TA1.  
• In the 3rd step, the patient uses a number of healthcare 
devices and creates measurement data and forwards them to 
the application hosting device which can be patient’s 
personal computer, mobile phone or any other trusted 
device. 
• In the 4th step, the application hosting device categorizes 
the measurement data. For example the measurement data  
MD2/1, is the second measurement taken by the patient 
which belongs to the data category 1, and the measurement 
data MD1/3 is the first measurement taken by the patient 
which belongs to the data category 3. Besides the fact that 
each measurement data belongs to a data category (DC), we 
assume that each measurement data belongs to an 
administrator category (AC). The hosting device encrypts 
the data according to an access policy P=P1 OR P2, which 
consists from two sub policies P1 and P2. Either P1 or P2 
must be satisfied in order to decrypt the ciphertext. The first 
part of the access policy P1 is intended for the social 
domain, therefore, the patient would be responsible to 
generate secret keys associated with attributes in P1, and the 
second part of the policy P2 is intended for the professional 
domain, therefore TA1 would be responsible to generate 
secret keys associated with attributes in P2. 
 
Fig. 2 Architecture of the proposed system 
 
The structure of P1 is as follows:   
ACDCMD1  OR  OR =P aaa ˆˆˆ  
This implies that in order to access the measurement data, 
the receiver must have a secret key SKMD (associated with 
attribute MDaˆ ), or a secret key SKDC (associated with 
attribute DCaˆ ), or the secret key SKAC (associated with 
attribute ACaˆ ). Note that, P1 contains attributes related to the 
resource (In CP-ABE a policy contains attributes which 
identify the user), in which the attribute MDaˆ identifies the 
measured data MD, the attribute DCaˆ  identifies the data 
category DC, and the attribute ACaˆ  identifies the 
administrator category AC. The motivation behind this 
categorization is that if a patient wants to allow the 
recipient to decrypt all measurement data belonging to the 
category 1, then the secret key SKDC1 is given to the 
recipient. The secret key SKMD1/1 can be used to decrypt 
only one measurement data MD1/1, and the secret key SKAC 
can be used to decrypt all measures, therefore, this key is 
known only to the patient, or to someone with whom the 
patient has a special relation. The structure of P2 is dynamic 
and depends on patient preferences and contains attributes 
associated with users from the professional domain.  
• In the 5th step, the encrypted data is sent to the web PHR 
repository.  
• From the stored data, eventually a patient could see health 
trends and begin to learn what lifestyle or other behaviours 
are affecting her glucose levels or blood pressure. This kind 
of information would be useful to a doctor to determine if 
the patient should be on a certain medication, if dosage 
should be adjusted, if the medication is having minimal or 
no affect. When the doctor from the professional domain 
wants to see patient data, it downloads the encrypted data 
from the server, and decrypts them locally using her secret 
key, as shown in step 6th.  
• In the 7th step, the patient receives a request from a user 
from the social domain with whom the patient may have no 
pre-arranged trust relationship, to see his/her data.  
• In the 8th step, the patient makes a decision regarding 
whether to issue or not the secret key to the requesting user 
from the social domain. The patient bases his decision on 
the requester’s reputation score generated by the reputation 
evaluation engine.  The reputation evaluation engine may 
take as input the ratings given by other users, and outputs 
the reputation of the requester [10]. Note that, the patient 
uses the reputation evaluation engine only when the 
requester does not have a digital certificate. If the requester 
has a digital certificate which shows his claimed identity, 
role or affiliation, then the patient generates the requester’s 
secret key based on the received digital certificate.  
• In the 9th step, the patient runs the key generation algorithm 
to generate the secret key associated with a set of attributes 
related to the document. The patient could generate 
different types of secret keys with different decryption 
power. If the user has high reputation, he will get a secret 
key with higher decryption power and vice versa.  The 
requesting user uses the secret key to decrypt the encrypted 
data. 
B. Our Construction 
In this section, first we present few facts about the bilinear 
maps, and then we give the construction of our proposed 
scheme. 
Bilinear Maps: Let 
 
G0  and 1G  be two multiplicative groups 
of prime order p, and let g be a generator of G0. A bilinear 
map 1 0 0 GGG →×:e satisfies the following properties [11]: 
• Bilinear: for all 
 
 Gu, v 0∈ and ,, Zba ∈  we 
have abba )) = e(u, v,ve(u . 
• Non-degenerate: .e(g,g) = 1  
 
G0  is said to be a bilinear group if the group operation in 
 
G0 and the bilinear map 1 0 0 GGG →×:e can be computed 
efficiently. Note that the map is symmetric 
since ababba g) e(g, = )g,e(g= )g,e(g . For more details on bilinear 
pairing we refer the readers to [12]. We now present our 
proposed multi-authority CP-ABE scheme.  
 
Setup (1k): 
Run by TA1. It selects a bilinear group G0 of prime order p and 
generator g. Next to this, it selects randomly 
.,,,, 21 pn Zxxx ∈Lβ For a set of attributes { },,,, 21 naaa L=ΩPD it 
sets ).1( njgT jxj ≤≤=  The public key is published as:  
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The components of the master secret key are:  
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Run by TA2. The bilinear group G0 of prime order p and 
generator g is selected. It also selects randomly 
.
ˆ,,ˆ,ˆ, 21 pn Zxxx ∈Lα For attribute set { } =SD naaa ˆ,ˆ,ˆ 11 LΩ which 
has three types of attributes: administrator category attribute, 
data category attributes, and measurement data attributes, it 
sets ).1(ˆ ˆ njgT jxj ≤≤=  The public key is published as: 
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The components of the master secret key are:  
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Key Gen (MK, ω): 
Run by TA1. The algorithm takes as input the attribute set 
}...{ k1 aaAlice =ω   which identify the requesting user (e.g. Alice). 
It picks a random value pZf ∈   and computes the secret key 
for Alice which consists of the following components:  
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Run by TA2. Suppose Bob, who is part of the social domain, 
asks for a secret key for the attribute set }ˆ...ˆ{ k1B aaob =ω (Note 
that these attributes identify the resource and not the 
requesting user). The TA2 picks a random value pZr ∈ and 
computes the secret key which consists of the following 
components:  
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Encrypt (m, PK, P): 
As mentioned before, the scheme is designed to help patients 
to share securely their personal health records. Therefore, we 
describe only the encryption algorithm run by the patient.  
Run by the patient (TA2). In the proposed scheme, the patient 
encrypts the data according to the access policy P = P1 OR P2, 
where ACDCMD1  OR  OR =P aaa ˆˆˆ  , and P2 is the access policy over 
the attributes from the professional domain. To encrypt the 
measurement data m,
 
the patient chooses at random pZs ∈  and 
computes the following components: 
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The is values are generated using Benaloh and Leichter [12] 
secret sharing scheme. The scheme takes as input the secret to 
be shared s, and generates the shares is  of the secret s in the 
following fashion: 
• Transforms P2 into an access tree where the interior nodes 
represent an AND or OR Boolean operators, and the leaf 
nodes represent attributes. The scheme, recursively, for 
each un-assigned non-leaf node does the following: 
a) If the node is AND, it assigns a share is to each child node, 
such that the sum of all shares is .s Mark this node as assigned. 
b) If the node is OR, it assigns the same value s to each child 
node. Mark this node as assigned. 
In addition, the patient computes the helper data W which 
helps the users from the professional domain to decrypt the 
data: 
.-   thus,),(),(),( βγαβαγ =⋅== sss ggeggeggeW  
At the end, the patient uploads the ciphertext CT along with 
the helper data W to his/her PHR.  
 
Decrypt (CT, W, SK): 
Run by a user from the PD. The decryption algorithm takes as 
input the secret key AliceωSK  of user Alice, the ciphertext CT, 
and the helper data .W It checks if the secret key 
AliceωSK related to the attribute set Aliceω satisfies the access 
policy P2. If not, then it outputs ┴.  If yes, then the algorithm 
chooses the smallest subset ω ′ that satisfies P2 and computes: 
 (a)               ( ) ( ) ( ) sjja ggeDCeCDeZ βω ,,, )1()1()4()2()1( =⋅∏= ′∈  
 
(b) The measurement data m, is recovered by computing: 
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Run by a user from the SD. The decryption algorithm takes as 
input the secret key BobωSK of user Bob, and the ciphertext CT. 
To decrypt the ciphertext (assuming that the user has a secret 
key associated with at least one attribute from P1), the 
decryptor first computes: 
 
(a)             ( ) ( ) ( ) sj ggeCDeCDeZ α,,ˆ,ˆ )1()1()3()2()2( =⋅=  
 
(b) The measurement data m is recovered by computing: 
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C. Security Intuition 
In this section, we briefly discuss the security of the 
proposed scheme. To decrypt the ciphertext and reveal m, 
without having necessary attributes that satisfy the policy, the 
adversary has to compute sgge β),(  or ( ) sgge α, , and then divide 
the product of )2(C and sgge β),( with W , or divide 
)2(C with ( ) sgge α, . Thus the adversary must compute ( ) fsgge ,  
or ( )rsgge , , which can be computed by pairing the components 
of the secret key )2(D  or )2(ˆD  with the components of the 
ciphertext )4(jC or )3(jC . To perform such operations the 
adversary has to use only the secret key components received 
in the key generation phase.  Therefore, the adversary cannot 
compute ( ) fsgge , or ( )rsgge , without having enough attributes 
which satisfy the access policy. The very important security 
property of our scheme is that is collusion safe, different users 
can not combine their secret keys and satisfy the access policy. 
This is because each user gets a secret key which is 
randomized with a different value (r and f). 
In a full security proof of our scheme we will follow the 
security model presented by Bethencourt et al [8] (in our 
security model the adversary can choose to decrypt a 
ciphertext associated with an access policy which contains 
attributes from two trusted authorities), and use the generic 
group model, introduced by Shoup [13]. The proof in this 
model is based on the fact that the discrete logarithm and the 
Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP) are hard to solve as long as 
the order of the group is a large prime number. In generic 
group model, group elements of 
 
G0  and 1G are encoded as 
unique random strings, in such a way that the adversary 
cannot test any property other than equality.  To perform 
group operations, the adversary has access to oracles which 
perform group operations in 
 
G0  and ,G1 and to the oracle 
which perform pairing operations. The adversary to break the 
scheme must be able to exploit the mathematical properties of 
the groups used in the scheme. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a new approach for secure management 
of personal health records which are stored and shared from 
an un-trusted web server. We gave an overview of various 
access control mechanisms and analyze which mechanisms 
are most useful for scenarios where data is stored on a 
commercial PHR systems or it is outsourced to a third party 
data center. Traditional access control mechanisms as well as 
traditional encryption techniques are not suitable to be used in 
these scenarios. The CP-ABE scheme has shown to be more 
useful in a healthcare setting since the access policy is 
enforced by virtually associating the access control policy to 
the protected data. This removes the need for involving a 
trusted entity which has to enforce access policies. 
The core contribution of this paper is the construction of a 
multi-authority of CP-ABE scheme. The proposed scheme 
allows patients to encrypt the data according to an access 
policy over a set of attributes issued by two trusted authorities. 
The scheme does not require the presence of a central 
authority to coordinate the work of the trusted authorities, and 
may support very expressive access policies, including 
policies written in disjunctive normal form (DNF) or 
conjunctive normal form (CNF). A possible future work is to 
formally provide a security proof for the proposed scheme. 
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